UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

GREGORY EARL STEVENSON,)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
)	
v.)	No. 1:20-cv-271-SNLJ
)	
CIARA SHAFFER, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Gregory Earl Stevenson, an inmate at the Scott County Jail, for leave to commence this civil action without prepaying fees or costs. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of \$1.00. Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will give plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint, and will deny without prejudice the motion to appoint counsel.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action *in forma pauperis* is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior sixmonth period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to his account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. *Id*.

Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement. Instead, he has advised that his institution will not provide him with one. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of \$1.00, an amount that is reasonable based upon the information before the Court. *See Henderson v. Norris*, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount "that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances.").

Legal Standard on Initial Review

This Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed *in forma pauperis* if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atlantic Corp.* v. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. *Id.* at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." *Id.* at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555).

This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that "if the essence of an allegation is discernible," the court should "construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." *Solomon v. Petray*, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Stone v. Harry*, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even *pro se* complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. *Martin v. Aubuchon*, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, *Stone*, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. *See McNeil v. United States*, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against law enforcement officers Ciara Shaffer, Calden Olden, Cliff Jackson, Zachary Boyer, Ryan Vincent, and Flint Dees. Plaintiff specifies he sues Shaffer and Jackson in their official and individual capacities. He does not specify the capacity in which he sues Olden, Boyer, Vincent, or Dees.

Review of publicly-available records on Missouri Case.net shows that plaintiff is presently facing charges of felony assault and resisting or interfering with arrest in the Circuit Court of Scott County. *See State v. Gregory Earl Stevenson*, No. 20SO-CR01206-01 (33rd Jud. Cir. 2020). As of the date of this Memorandum and Order, plaintiff is represented by counsel and a jury trial is scheduled for June 10, 2021.

In the complaint at bar, plaintiff claims he was subjected to illegal arrest on September 21, 2020 in Sikeston, Missouri. In support, plaintiff writes:

They claim that they had a 911 call of a[n] individual [brandishing] a weapon. They fail[ed] to ask for I.D. and fail[ed] to ask the owner of the house was they

the ones who called [sic]. They did not have probable [cause] to search me or my person and they created a pretext arrest to arrest me. In the mi[d]st of this confusion there was no evidence found. They punch[ed] me in the sides tased me disrupted my vocal cord [and] my voice is not the same, and illegally arrest me on [illegible] retaliation from a previous arrest.

(ECF No. 1 at 4-5). Plaintiff appears to indicate he has been wrongfully denied medical treatment for injury to his vocal cords, and he claims he suffered mental injuries from "a illegal arrest injury." *Id.* at 5. Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in an unspecified amount to compensate him for lost wages and mental anguish. Attached to the complaint are copies of motions plaintiff filed *pro se* in his pending State court criminal case seeking bond reduction, change of judge, discovery, dismissal of charges, and other relief.

Discussion

The complaint is subject to dismissal. In setting forth the allegations in support of his claims, plaintiff refers to the defendants collectively as "they," and concludes his rights were violated. Plaintiff has therefore failed to allege facts showing that any named defendant was causally linked to and directly responsible for violating his rights, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights."); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff). Moreover, by lumping the defendants into a group and providing no factual basis to distinguish their conduct, plaintiff has failed to give any named defendant fair notice of the grounds for the claims made against him or her.

The Court will give plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to clearly set forth his claims and allegations in support. Plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will completely replace the original complaint. See In re Wireless Telephone Federal Cost Recovery Fees Litigation, 396 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2005) ("It is well-established that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect"). Plaintiff must type or neatly print the amended complaint on the Court's prisoner civil rights complaint form, which will be provided to him. See E.D. Mo. L.R. 2.06(A) ("All actions brought by self-represented plaintiffs or petitioners should be filed on Court-provided forms where applicable.").

In the "Caption" section of the complaint form, plaintiff should write the name of the person he intends to sue. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ("The title of the complaint must name all the parties"). Plaintiff must avoid naming anyone as a defendant unless that person is directly related to his claim. Plaintiff must also specify the capacity in which he intends to sue the defendant.

In the "Statement of Claim" section, plaintiff should begin by writing the defendant's name. In separate, numbered paragraphs under that name, plaintiff should set forth a short and plain statement of the facts that support his claim or claims against that defendant. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Each averment must be simple, concise, and direct. *See id.* Plaintiff must state his claims in numbered paragraphs, and each paragraph should be "limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). If plaintiff names a single defendant, he may set forth as many claims as he has against that defendant. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff names more than one defendant, he should only include claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or simply put, claims that are related to each other. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

It is important that plaintiff allege facts explaining how the defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for harming him. *See Madewell*, 909 F.2d at 1208. Plaintiff

must explain the role of the defendant, so that the defendant will have notice of what he or she is accused of doing or failing to do. *See Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that the essential function of a complaint "is to give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim."). Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that the "Statement of Claim" requires more than "labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." *See Neubauer v. FedEx Corp.*, 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to appoint counsel. The Court will deny the motion at this time, without prejudice. "A pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case." *Stevens v. Redwing*, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998). When determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, the Court considers factors such as the complexity of the case, the litigant's ability to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, and the litigant's ability to present his claims. *Id*.

After considering these factors, the Court concludes that the appointment of counsel is unwarranted at this time. Based upon plaintiff's allegations, it appears this case is factually and legally straightforward, and there is no indication that plaintiff will be unable to investigate the facts and clearly present his claims. Additionally, the motion is premature, as no defendant has been served with process and discovery has not begun. The Court will therefore deny the motion for the appointment of counsel without prejudice, and will entertain future motions for the appointment of counsel, if appropriate, as this litigation progresses.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion seeking leave to commence this action without prepaying fees or costs (ECF No. 2) is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must pay an initial filing fee of \$1.00 within

thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to

"Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison

registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) the statement that the remittance is for an

original proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to mail to plaintiff a copy of the

Court's prisoner civil rights complaint form.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff must file an amended complaint within

thirty (30) days from the date of this Order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 3)

is **DENIED** without prejudice.

Plaintiff's failure to timely comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this

case, without prejudice and without further notice.

Dated this 4th day of May, 2021.

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.

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SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE